<AXIOLOGIEANALYSE />
<AXIOLOGYANALYSIS /> poses the question that precedes every ethics before it formulates its first norms: What is good at all – and how do we know this? Normative claims presuppose value judgements. Whoever says that one ought to speak the truth presupposes that sincerity is good or that lying is bad. <AXIOLOGYANALYSIS /> reconstructs this value dimension in its inner architecture – separately from the question of what follows from it. Its object is not "What is commanded?" but "What counts as good, why, and from what source does this text draw its value at all?"
This last question is the methodological heart of the module and, at the same time, the question that philosophical texts most rarely answer explicitly: the diagnosis of the value source. Every ethics sets in somewhere – with an instance that generates, bears, or discloses value. But this instance is seldom identified as such. <AXIOLOGYANALYSIS /> makes it visible by asking: From what source does this text draw its value?
Kant draws it from reason – yet not as an abstract calculation, but as a self-wrought feeling of respect. For Kant, the feeling of respect is not an empirical feeling like joy or pain that affects us from outside; it is a feeling that reason generates in itself by recognising its own authority. The value lies in the rational form of willing itself – not in what is willed. Mill draws his value from the opposite source: from utility experienced as pleasurable or agreeable. What is good is what produces pleasure or avoids pain – not as a construct, but as an immediate quality of experience. Here, value is anchored in the experience itself, not in the form of thought. Aristotle draws it neither from the form of reason nor from experience alone, but from the unfolded disposition of character and the flourishing life: eudaimonia is not a state that occurs, but a practice that succeeds – the value lies in the realisation of what a being can be by nature. Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann take a different path: for them, values constitute an autonomous realm that is reducible neither to reason nor to pleasure, but is disclosed a priori through intentional feelings – through a peculiar emotional feeling of value. Habermas and Apel relocate the source of value in communicative reason: good is that on which ideal participants in discourse could reach agreement under fair conditions – value emerges from the process of rational understanding itself. And care ethics, finally, anchors value in responsiveness to concrete others: not in abstract principles, but in the capacity to respond appropriately to need within relationships.
These six sources of value are not an exhaustive taxonomy – but they are the systemically decisive points at which the path divides. Whoever does not know from which source a text draws its value analyses its axiological surface, not its deep architecture. <AXIOLOGYANALYSIS /> therefore always begins with the question of the value source – and then examines whether the remaining axiological structure is consistent with this source.
The second core methodological question concerns naturalism. Broad and Moore have shown that the question What is good? leads into a trap when it is confused with the question What has the property of being good? The naturalistic fallacy consists in reducing goodness to natural properties – to being-pleasurable, being-evolutionarily-advantageous, being-socially-approved, or being-willed-by-God. Against this, Broad and Moore hold: goodness is a non-natural intrinsic property – it does indeed depend on the intrinsic nature of a thing, but is not identical with it. That something is pleasurable does not thereby make it good; one could always still meaningfully ask: But is pleasure really good? This open question – Moore's open-question argument – indicates that goodness is not exhausted in natural descriptions. <AXIOLOGYANALYSIS /> systematically examines whether a text respects this boundary or whether it tacitly reduces goodness to a natural, theological, or psychological property.
A third fundamental distinction concerns value typology. Not every good is good in the same way. Intrinsic value means: a thing is good for its own sake, independently of what it leads to. Instrumental value means: a thing is good as a means to something else. Final value designates a value as an end in itself – close to the intrinsic, but not identical with it: something can be finally good without being intrinsically good, if the end itself only acquires its goodness through a context. Alongside these there is contributory value – the value that an element contributes within a whole, which is not identical with the intrinsic value of the element by itself – and pro tanto value – value that can be overridden, subject to weighing against other considerations. <AXIOLOGYANALYSIS /> determines the value type for each identified good – and examines whether the text draws these distinctions or blurs them.
Finally, the module analyses the thick/thin structure of value vocabulary. Thin value predicates such as good or bad carry evaluative content without descriptive content. Thick concepts such as courageous, cruel, loyal, or just combine both: they describe and evaluate at the same time. Whoever calls someone cruel has thereby already made an evaluation – without the evaluation becoming visible as a separate step. This makes thick concepts particularly effective, yet also particularly inconspicuous, axiological instruments. <AXIOLOGYANALYSIS /> identifies them, separates their descriptive and evaluative content, and asks what axiological work they perform within the argument.
→ <AXIOLOGYANALYSIS /> operates at the level of value: What counts as good – and from what source? The transition to the ought belongs to <NORMATIVEANALYSIS />, which must make explicit the bridging principle between value judgement and normative judgement. → In questions concerning value realism and the status of non-natural properties, <ONTOLOGICALANALYSIS /> is indispensable as a subsequent step: the source of value and the ontology of value are two different questions – what generates value and what value is must be examined separately, yet in relation to one another. → Its most sensitive diagnostic point is the unidentified value source: texts that never name their axiological starting point introduce value judgements as self-evident – and thereby withhold from analysis precisely what sustains their entire normative architecture.
<AXIOLOGIEANALYSE> ... </AXIOLOGIEANALYSE>
<PTL>
<ZIELE>
<ZIEL>Identification and reconstruction of the value dimension of texts: Which things, states, or actions are evaluated as good or bad—and according to which type of value?</ZIEL>
<ZIEL>Diagnosis of the source of value: From what does an ethical theory derive its value—reason, the experience of pleasure, virtue, emotional intuition, capacity for communicative assent, or a caring relationship?</ZIEL>
<ZIEL>Strict distinction between intrinsic value (value in itself), instrumental value (value as a means), and final value (value as an end)</ZIEL>
<ZIEL>Naturalism diagnostics according to Broad/Moore: Is goodness reduced to natural, theological, or psychological facts—or treated as an irreducible non-natural property?</ZIEL>
<ZIEL>Meta-axiological classification: Are values treated as objectively real, constructed, projected, or expressive?</ZIEL>
<ZIEL>Analysis of value collisions: hierarchization, incommensurability, trade-offs, thresholds, lexical priorities</ZIEL>
<ZIEL>Separation of levels: Strictly distinguish value judgments (good/bad) from normative judgments (ought/must)—and make bridge principles explicit at the transition</ZIEL>
</ZIELE>
<THEMA>The value dimension of philosophical texts: value typology, sources of value, naturalism, and axiological structures</THEMA>
<PERSPEKTIVEN>
<PERSPEKTIVE>Typological (intrinsic, instrumental, final, contributory, pro tanto)</PERSPEKTIVE>
<PERSPEKTIVE>Source-related (source of value: reason, pleasure, virtue, intuition, discourse, care)</PERSPEKTIVE>
<PERSPEKTIVE>Meta-axiological (naturalism/non-naturalism; realism/anti-realism)</PERSPEKTIVE>
<PERSPEKTIVE>Phenomenological (experience of value: injustice, beauty, courage as experienced qualities)</PERSPEKTIVE>
<PERSPEKTIVE>Comparative (value collisions, trade-offs, incommensurability, hierarchies)</PERSPEKTIVE>
</PERSPEKTIVEN>
<METHODEN>
<METHODE>Naturalism diagnostics: Critical examination of whether evaluative predicates can be translated without remainder into empirical, theological, biological, sociological, or psychological facts—or whether goodness remains an irreducible non-natural property</METHODE>
<METHODE>Identification of value vocabulary and passages: Systematic search for evaluative predicates, comparatives, rankings, and justifications of value</METHODE>
<METHODE>Source-of-value analysis: Reconstruction of the source from which the text derives its value—reason (Kant), the experience of pleasure (Mill), virtue/eudaimonia (Aristotle), emotional intuition/value-feeling (Scheler/Hartmann), communicative reason (Habermas/Apel), caring relationships (Care Ethics)</METHODE>
<METHODE>Value typology: Classification as intrinsic, instrumental, final, contributory, or pro tanto</METHODE>
<METHODE>Fitting-attitude test: Examination of whether value is explained in terms of fitting attitudes or emotions—value as that toward which a particular affective attitude is appropriate</METHODE>
<METHODE>Analysis of comparability and trade-offs: Criteria for ‘better,’ incommensurability, thresholds, and lexical priority in value collisions</METHODE>
<METHODE>Thick/thin analysis: Mixed descriptive-normative concepts (courageous, cruel, just) versus thin value predicates (good/bad); semantic and argumentative consequences</METHODE>
<METHODE>Phenomenological reconstruction: Description of the experience of value (injustice, beauty, courage) and its qualitative structure</METHODE>
<METHODE>Meta-axiological classification: Diagnosis of whether values are treated as objective, constructed, projected, or expressive</METHODE>
<METHODE>Conflict and trade-off scenarios: Thought experiments and cases used to test implicit priorities and rules of evaluation</METHODE>
</METHODEN>
<KERNFRAGEN>
<KERNFRAGE dim="Wertvokabular">Which things, states, or actions are evaluated as good or bad—and by means of which value vocabulary?</KERNFRAGE>
<KERNFRAGE dim="Werttypus">What kind of value is postulated—intrinsic, instrumental, final, contributory, or pro tanto?</KERNFRAGE>
<KERNFRAGE dim="Wertquelle">From what does the text derive its value? From reason (the categorical imperative, the feeling of respect as a self-produced feeling in Kant)? From utility experienced as pleasurable (Mill)? From virtue as a developed character disposition and eudaimonia (Aristotle)? From emotional value-feeling as an a priori intuition of an autonomous realm of values (Scheler, Hartmann)? From communicative reason and the capacity for discursive assent (Habermas, Apel)? From caring relationships and responsiveness to concrete others (Care Ethics)?</KERNFRAGE>
<KERNFRAGE dim="Naturalismus">Is value treated as a natural or non-natural intrinsic property? Is goodness reducible to empirical facts—or is it irreducible (Broad/Moore)?</KERNFRAGE>
<KERNFRAGE dim="Wertkollisionen">How is the relationship among values determined—hierarchization, incommensurability, trade-offs?</KERNFRAGE>
<KERNFRAGE dim="SummumBonum">Is there a highest value (summum bonum) in the text—and what absolute reference point does it constitute for the axiological scale?</KERNFRAGE>
<KERNFRAGE dim="Werterfahrung">How is the experience of value and disvalue described phenomenologically—as a quality of experience, as cognitive insight, or as an affective response?</KERNFRAGE>
<KERNFRAGE dim="Thick/Thin">How are value judgments constituted semantically and pragmatically—as thin value predicates or as thick concepts that combine descriptive and evaluative content?</KERNFRAGE>
<KERNFRAGE dim="Motivation">What role does motivation play in relation to value—attraction/repulsion; internalist versus externalist theses of motivation?</KERNFRAGE>
<KERNFRAGE dim="Wertkonflikte">How are value conflicts addressed—through balancing, priority rules, threshold logic, or lexical ordering?</KERNFRAGE>
</KERNFRAGEN>
<KATEGORIEN>
<KATEGORIE>Concepts of Value (goodness, merit—strictly isolated from deontic concepts of normativity)</KATEGORIE>
<KATEGORIE>Source of value (reason / pleasure / virtue / emotional intuition / communicative reason / care)</KATEGORIE>
<KATEGORIE>Typology of naturalism (theological, biological/sociological, psychological—analytical differentiation of value-reductive variants)</KATEGORIE>
<KATEGORIE>Natural vs. Non-natural Intrinsic Properties (Broad/Moore: goodness as an irreducible property)</KATEGORIE>
<KATEGORIE>Intrinsic value (value in itself, not as a means)</KATEGORIE>
<KATEGORIE>Instrumental value (value as a means to some other good)</KATEGORIE>
<KATEGORIE>Final value (value as an end; distinguishable from intrinsic value)</KATEGORIE>
<KATEGORIE>Value realism / anti-realism (objective value status versus constructivist/expressivist status)</KATEGORIE>
<KATEGORIE>Thick / Thin Concepts (thick descriptive-evaluative concepts versus thin value predicates)</KATEGORIE>
<KATEGORIE>Fitting Attitude (value explained in terms of fitting affective attitudes)</KATEGORIE>
<KATEGORIE>Incommensurability (values being in principle incomparable)</KATEGORIE>
<KATEGORIE>Epistemic value (truth, clarity, and understanding as values)</KATEGORIE>
<KATEGORIE>Summum Bonum (the highest value as an axiological reference point)</KATEGORIE>
</KATEGORIEN>
<REGELN>
<REGEL1>Systematically identify all passages containing evaluative predicates, comparatives, rankings, and justifications of value—whether explicitly through value vocabulary or implicitly through phenomenological descriptions</REGEL1>
<REGEL2>Determine the source of value: From what does the text derive its value? Reason, pleasure, virtue, emotional intuition, discursive assent, or care? The source of value determines the scope and type of the entire axiological architecture</REGEL2>
<REGEL3>Examine according to Broad/Moore: Is goodness reduced naturalistically (to empirical, biological, theological, or psychological facts)—or is it treated as a non-natural, irreducible property that depends only on the intrinsic nature of the thing?</REGEL3>
<REGEL4>Classify each type of value: intrinsic, instrumental, final, contributory, pro tanto—and strictly distinguish value judgments (good/bad) from normative judgments (ought/must); make bridge principles explicit at the transition</REGEL4>
<REGEL5>Examine the thick/thin structure: Mixed descriptive-normative concepts (courageous, cruel, loyal) carry implicit evaluations that cannot be translated into thin value predicates by paraphrase without loss</REGEL5>
<REGEL6>Analyze value collisions and incommensurability: Are conflicts resolved through balancing, hierarchization, threshold logic, or lexical priority—or is incommensurability acknowledged?</REGEL6>
</REGELN>
<ANALYSEKRITERIEN>
<KRITERIUM>Complete diagnosis of the source of value: From which source does the text derive its value—and is this source maintained consistently throughout?</KRITERIUM>
<KRITERIUM>Correct diagnosis of naturalism according to Broad/Moore: naturalistic reduction versus non-natural property, supported by textual evidence</KRITERIUM>
<KRITERIUM>Precise value typology distinguishing intrinsic, instrumental, and final value</KRITERIUM>
<KRITERIUM>Strict separation of levels: value judgments versus normative judgments—bridge principles at the transition explicitly identified</KRITERIUM>
<KRITERIUM>Demonstration of the thick/thin structure and its semantic consequences, supported by textual evidence</KRITERIUM>
<KRITERIUM>Close adherence to the text and internal consistency; value collisions and the logic by which they are resolved made explicit</KRITERIUM>
</ANALYSEKRITERIEN>
<AXIOLOGIEANALYSE
ziel="Identifikation und Rekonstruktion der Wertdimension: Werttypologie, Wertquellen, Naturalismus-Diagnose und axiologische Strukturen"
normativeBegriffe="gut, schlecht, richtig, falsch, Wert, Würde, Wohlergehen, Schönheit"
perspektive="introspektiv|epistemisch|phänomenologisch"
analyseFokus="semantisch|logisch|ontologisch|quellenbezogen"
wertart="intrinsisch|instrumentell|beide"
epistemischeQuelle="rational|intuitiv|einsichtig|affektiv|diskursiv|relational"
methode="stufenweise|systematisch|punktuell"
naturalismus="naturalistisch|non-naturalistisch|beide"
schnittstellen="NormativeAnalyse|SemantischeAnalyse|GeltungstheoretischeAnalyse|OntologischeAnalyse"
>
<!-- Analysis steps:
1. Identify value vocabulary: evaluative predicates, comparatives, rankings, and justifications of value
2. Diagnose the source of value: reason (Kant) / pleasure (Mill) / virtue/eudaimonia (Aristotle) /
emotional value-feeling (Scheler/Hartmann) / communicative reason (Habermas/Apel) / care (Care Ethics)?
3. Examine naturalism according to Broad/Moore: reduction to natural facts—or a non-natural property?
4. Classify the type of value: intrinsic / instrumental / final / contributory / pro tanto
5. Examine the fitting-attitude structure: Is value explained in terms of fitting attitudes/emotions?
6. Analyze thick/thin: thick concepts with implicit evaluation versus thin value predicates
7. Reconstruct the experience of value phenomenologically: quality, immediacy, affective structure
8. Examine value collisions: hierarchy, incommensurability, trade-offs, thresholds
9. Distinguish value judgments from normative judgments; make bridge principles explicit
10. Map interfaces: NormativeAnalyse (value→norm transition),
OntologischeAnalyse (status of evaluative properties),
GeltungstheoretischeAnalyse (justification of value judgments)
-->
</AXIOLOGIEANALYSE>
<METAPRUEFUNGEN>
<PRUEFEKOHAERENZ />
<PRUEFETEXTBEZUG />
<FINDEARGUMENTALTERNATIVE />
<PRUEFEANNAHMEN />
<ERLAEUTERERELEVANZ />
</METAPRUEFUNGEN>
<TEXTERSTELLUNG>
<ANTWORESTRIKTANALYSEORIENTIERT />
</TEXTERSTELLUNG>
</PTL>